FINANCIAL LEVERAGE AND PERFORMANCE OF LISTED FIRMS IN A FRONTIER MARKET: PANEL EVIDENCE FROM KENYA by Mule, Robert Kisavi & Mukras, Mohamed Suleiman
European  Scientific Journal   March  2015  edition vol.11, No.7   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
534 
FINANCIAL LEVERAGE AND PERFORMANCE 
OF LISTED FIRMS IN A FRONTIER MARKET: 
PANEL EVIDENCE FROM KENYA 
 
 
 
Robert Kisavi Mule, PhD, MBA, B.Ed (Hons) 
Department of Accounting & Finance, School of Business & Economics 
Maseno University, Private Bag, Maseno, Kenya 
Prof. Mohamed Suleiman Mukras 
Department of Economics, Maseno University 
 
 
Abstract  
 This paper investigates the relationship between financial leverage 
and the financial performance of listed firm in Kenya. We use annual data 
for the period 2007 – 2011. Using various panel procedures, the study finds 
reasonably strong evidence that financial leverage significantly, and 
negatively, affects the performance of listed firms in Kenya (ROA, β = - 
.0438, p = .0350) and Tobin’s Q, β = -.5144, p = .0124). However, financial 
leverage negative but insignificant effect on ROE, β = -.0176, p = .5765).  
Unit root test results indicate: all the variables are integrated of order zero (p 
= .000). Second, because the performance of firms depends on other things 
than just their financial leverage, we control for the effects of those other 
variables by including them in our models. In this respect, the findings 
suggest that asset tangibility (β = .2302, p = .0215) and ownership 
concentration (β = -.0057 (p = .0353) are important determinants of 
performance measured in terms of Tobin’s Q. The study concludes that; that 
financial leverage is an important negative predictor of financial 
performance measured in terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q; ownership 
concentration is a pertinent negative predictor of financial performance 
measured in terms of Tobin’s Q and asset tangibility is a significant positive 
predictor of performance measured in terms of ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
 
Keywords: Financial leverage, Tobin’s Q, Return on Assets, Return on 
Equity, Panel data, frontier market, Kenya  
 
Introduction 
 Corporate Finance literature offers five theories that explain firms’ 
financial leverage choices. The first school of thought is the trade-off theory, 
which argues for the existence of an optimal capital structure, by 
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incorporating various imperfections to capital markets ignored by the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) hypotheses, but retaining the assumptions of 
market efficiency and symmetric information. Thus, although increasing 
financial leverage might enable a firm to increase its value by profiting from 
tax shields on debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), higher financial leverage 
might lead to higher expected direct and indirect financial distress costs, 
which decrease the firm’s value (Ross et al., 2002). According to the trade-
off theory, therefore, the optimum financing mix coincides with the level of 
financial leverage at which the benefits and costs of debt financing are 
exactly balanced. The trade-off theory of leverage assumes that there are 
benefits to leverage within capital structure used until an optimal capital 
structure is attained. The theory recognizes that (tax benefit) debt interest is 
tax deductible. This reduces the tax liability thus increasing tax shield. A 
high proportion of debt in a company makes it very risky for investors to 
invest in it. This make to demand investors a high premium on stock or high 
dividend. The theory assumes that a firm has an optimum capital structure 
based on trade-off between costs and benefits of using debt. This theory does 
not explain the conservative nature of firms when using debt finance, why 
leverage is consistence in most countries yet they have divergent taxation 
systems (Popescu, 2009).  
 Firm’s optimal debt ratio is determined by a trade-off between the 
bankruptcy cost and tax advantage of borrowing and it is achieved at the 
point when the marginal present value of the tax on additional debt is equal 
to the increase in the present value of financial distress costs (Owalobi and 
Anyang, 2013).  
 The second school of thought explaining firms’ capital structure 
choice is the pecking order hypothesis. Invoking agency theory, signaling 
hypothesis and information asymmetry, the pecking order hypothesis argues 
that firms have a preference order for different types of finance, reflecting 
their ease of availability or relative costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
pecking order hypothesis does not emphasize target leverage; rather, current 
leverage reflects firm’s historical profitability and the need for additional 
investment funds at some point in time. This theory explains why internal 
finance is more popular than external finance and why debt is considered the 
best option for firms. Debt finance is considered attractive, cheap and more 
profitable as it is considered flexible.  
 Pecking theory is based on information asymmetry. If managers have 
more information than other parties then information costs rises. Thus firms 
will prefer issuing shares when they are overvalued or last resort. Managers 
will use pecking order by first using internally generated funds. If more 
funds is required then go for cheap debt (capital with fixed interest) before 
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equity (capital with variable interest rate) in financing the firms activities. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) as cited in Popescu (2009).  
 The third theory is irrelevancy theory. The theory was put forward by 
Modigliani and Miller in 1958. It is based on the following assumptions: No 
transactions cost, no taxes, no bankruptcy cost, equity in borrowing cost for 
investors, equity in access to information and no effect of debt on earnings 
before interest and tax. The theory indicates that in a perfect market, it does 
not matter the capital structure mix used by the firm the value of the firm 
remain constant. If a firm uses cheaper debt then this increases the risk of the 
firm consequently the stock holders will demand higher dividend to 
compensate them for the high risk in their investments MM theorized that 
market value of a firm is determined its ability to earn and the risk of its 
underlying assets. Thus the weighted average cost of capital should remain 
constant. MM argued that the value of a firm is not affected by capital 
structure but by the earning ability of the assets. The assumptions made do 
not hold in the real world hence other researchers have come up with various 
theories to fill the gap in real life situation (Abor, 2007).  
 The fourth theory is Market timing theory fronted by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) article relating to capital structure to past market to book 
ratio. According to this theory firms prefer equity when they perceive that its 
relative cost is low otherwise debt finance would be appropriate. Firms time 
their equity issues, they issue new stock when the stock price is perceived to 
be overvalued and buy back own shares when they are undervalued.  
 Fifth theory is free cash flow theory which postulates that managers 
are forced to pay excess cash to investors as dividend to equity holders and 
interest to debt holders. High debt ratio discipline managers and prohibits 
them not to invest in projects with negative NPVs making the firm 
profitable. Jensen (1976) argues that increasing leverage instills discipline in 
managers as they will be cautious not to make the firm insolvent (Owadabi 
and Anyang, 2013). 
 Other theoretical works (Khan, 2012, NSE Handbook, 2011 and 
Pandey, 2006) link financial leverage to performance of firms both positively 
and negatively. They recognize that the use of financial leverage is like a 
‘double - edged sword’ because it can either magnify the firm’s potential 
gains or losses (Pandey, 2006 and Khan, 2012). Records at the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange indicate that in the period 2006-2011, listed companies’ 
debt levels oscillated between 22.64 % and 76.2 % (NSE Handbook, 2011) 
implying that financial leverage of Kenya’s listed firms greatly varies.  
 Empirical evidence on the relationship between financial leverage 
and the financial performance of firms has been the subject of several studies 
since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, the 
evidence on these relationships has been mixed. Some researchers find a 
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positive relationship between financial leverage and firms’ financial 
performance (Taub, 1975; Roden and Lewellen, 1999; Champion, 1999; 
Ghosh and Jain, 2000; Hadlock and James, 2002 and Berger and Bonaccorsi, 
2006). These researchers generally argue that financial leverage has a 
positive effect on a firm’s returns on equity provided that the firm’s earnings 
power exceeds its interest cost of debt (Hutchinson, 1995) and that the level 
of leverage a firm should commit itself to depends on the flexibility with 
which the firm can adjust its debt usage should earnings power fall below its 
average interest cost (Hadlock and James, 2002). In an interesting study of 
the banking sector, Berger and Bonaccorsi (2006) demonstrate that high 
leverage ratio is related to higher profit efficiency. Other studies report 
negative relationship between leverage and financial performance (Vitor and 
Badu, 2012; Majumdar and Chhiber, 1999; Gleason et al., 2000; and Simerly 
and Li, 2000; Hammes, 2003; Mesquita and Lara, 2003; Zeitun and Tian, 
2007). 
 Although most of the extant financial leverage studies have been 
carried out in developed financial markets, some studies have examined the 
relationship between financial leverage and financial performance of firms in 
developing countries. Hung et al. (2002) find that while high gearing is 
positively related to assets, it’s negatively related to profit margins in Hong 
Kong’s property markets. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) finds that a high debt 
level is positively related to performance of micro-finance institutions in sub-
Saharan Africa. Contrarily, country-specific studies in Africa appear to 
consistently report a negative relationship between financial leverage and 
firm value (Abor (2005) for Ghana, Abor (2007) for South Africa and 
Ghana, Amidu (2007) for Ghana, and Onaolapo and Kajola (2010) for 
Nigeria) and Odongo et al. (2014) for Kenya. However, Ebaid (2009) finds a 
weak-to-no-effect of capital structure on firm performance for Egypt. 
 The foregoing evidence raises a fundamental question: is financial 
leverage associated with poor firm performance in Kenya? Our research is an 
attempt to seek answers to this question. We attempt to establish if there is a 
clear linkage between financial leverage and the performance of firms listed 
on the Nairobi Securities Exchange.  Performance is measured in terms of 
return on equity, return on assets and Tobin’s Q and use a panel empirical 
strategy. Our findings support the view that financial leverage has a 
significant (negative) impact on performance of firms listed in Kenya. The 
control variables included in the analysis also present interesting results. 
 
Econometric methodology 
 To reveal the effect of financial leverage on firm’s performance, the 
estimation procedure used by Wellalage and Locke (2012) and Berger et al. 
(1997) is adopted and modified as: 
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𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕   = 𝜷𝟎𝟏    + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕  +   𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑶𝑾𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕  +   𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒕    + 𝜺𝒊𝒕  (1)  
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕   = 𝜷𝟎𝟐    + 𝜷𝟐𝟏𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕  +   𝜷𝟐𝟐𝑶𝑾𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕  +   𝜷𝟐𝟑𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒕   + 𝜺𝒊𝒕  (2)   
𝑻𝑶𝑩𝑰𝑵′𝑺 𝑸𝒊𝒕   = 𝜷𝟎𝟑    + 𝜷𝟑𝟏𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕  +   𝜷𝟑𝟐𝑶𝑾𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕  +    𝜷𝟑𝟑𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒕   + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      (3) 
𝜺𝒊𝒕~𝑵 (0, 𝝈𝟐)     (4) 
 Where 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡         -ratio of net earnings divided to equity in book 
value for firm i in period t representing financial performance of firms listed 
at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of pre-tax profits to 
total assets for firm i in period t. This represents financial performance of 
firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of 
market capitalization to book value of assets for firm i in period t. This too 
represents financial performance of firms listed at the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of total debt to total capital for firm i in period t, 
representing financial leverage of firms listed at the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange. 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of shares held by the five greatest 
shareholders of firm i in period t, representing the ownership concentration 
of firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺it refers to asset 
tangibility defined as the ratio of the fixed tangible assets divided by the total 
assets for firm i in period t. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are the error terms while 𝑖𝑡  i and t represent 
listed firm and time respectively (I =1…N) and (t = 1….T). 
 The choice of three performance measures is motivated by the fact 
that these indicators have different interpretations regarding firm’s 
performance as proposed by Mesquita and Lara (2002). According to Cole 
and Mehran (1998) for a study of this nature to have a firm foundation and in 
line with previous studies (Ongore, 2011, Heracleas, 2001 and Laffont and 
Triole, 1991), it is necessary to choose measures of performance that are 
quantifiable, expressive and comparable. This study therefore uses the three 
measures of performance because they met these three attributes. These 
variables include: Tobin’s Q, Return on Equity (ROE), and Return on Assets 
(ROA).  
 
Data and unit root tests 
Data 
 This study examines the relationship between financial leverage and 
firm performance of publicly quoted companies at the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange using data for the period 2007 through 2011. Observations are 
sampled at annual intervals because financial leverage revisions often require 
the ratification of company shareholders, who typically meet on an annual 
basis in Kenya. Year 2007 is important in several respects. First, it coincided 
with the beginning of the 2007/2008 global recession and financial turmoil 
originating in the developed world that had since spread to developing 
countries and the Kenya’s listed firms had not been immune to the secondary 
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effects of this crisis. Second, the year also coincided with an important event 
in Kenya’s history: the change of political leadership from the NARC, to a 
coalition government for the first time since the country’s political 
independence after disputed 2007-08 general elections. Third, 2007 also 
marked the end of the second decade of Kenya’s economic reforms. Thus, 
the performance of firms was expected to reflect the better economic risk and 
sovereign risk environments as well as improved access to funding because 
economic reforms would make a wider range of financing instruments 
available to businesses. The listed companies were analyzed as a panel of the 
entire stock market. The performance and financial leverage data are 
collected from firms’ audited financial statements contained in NSE 
handbooks. 
 The Nairobi Securities Exchange had fifty eight listed firms at the 
end of 2012. However, several of the firms were listed after 2007 and hence 
did not have a time series long enough to enable us include them in the 
analysis. Some firms were left out due to non-availability of data. The final 
sample consisted of 47 listed firms for a period 2007 through 2011 which 
resulted in a sample of 235 firm year observations. A step by step analysis 
was done by first showing the descriptive statistics of the data used in the 
estimation.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for variables used in the Study 
Statistics OWNC LEV TOBINSQ ROE ROA TANG 
Mean 65.286 0.258 1.319 0.165 0.165 0.556 
Median 69.405 0.223 0.861 0.143 0.121 0.57 
Maximum 96.310 0.794 7.791 0.693 0.709 0.999 
Minimum 11.040 0.000 0.061 -0.238 -0.62 0.048 
Std. Dev. 17.292 0.172 1.346 0.12 0.172 0.243 
Skewness -0.892 0.881 2.028 1.045 0.448 0.17 
Observations 235 235 235 235 235 235 
Source: Field Data, 2014 
 
 The table shows the descriptive statistics for variables used in the 
study. The variables are defined thus: Tobin’s Q = (Market value of equity + 
Book value of debt) ÷ Book value of assets; ROA = pre-tax profits ÷ total 
assets of the company; ROE = Net earnings ÷ equity in book value; Asset 
Tangibility is defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Financial 
Leverage = total debt ÷ total capital for a firm; Ownership concentration = 
summation of amount of ownership of five greatest shareholders of a 
company relative to the total shareholding.    
 Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
study. The statistics show that the mean value for return on equity (ROE) is 
16.5 % with a positive skewness, indicating that most of the firms are 
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“clustered” on the right side of the distribution. In line with previous studies 
(Xu and Wang, 1997), ROE is the ratio of net earnings after tax divided by 
equity in book value and it measures the earnings generated by shareholders’ 
equity for a period of time, usually one accounting year. The values compare 
favorably to those obtained by previous studies (Maniagi et al., 2013) who 
obtain an average ROE of 17.759 %. This implies that on average, 
shareholders of firms listed at the NSE earn a return on their investment of 
16.5 % and the highest return and lowest returns (loses) on equity are 69.3 % 
and -23.8 % respectively during the period 2007 to 2011. Consequently, this 
means that listed companies generate Kshs16.5 profit on every Kshs 100 
invested by their shareholders during the same period. 
  The mean return on assets invested (ROA) is 16.5 %, also with 
positive skewness. In tandem with previous studies (Laffont and Triole, 
1991, Cole and Mehran, 1998 and Heracleas, 2001), ROA is the ratio of pre-
tax profits to total assets. It measures how much profit a firm can achieve 
using one unit of assets and it helps to evaluate the result of managerial 
decisions on the use of assets with which they have been entrusted by the 
shareholders of the company (Brigham and Houston, 2001). These values 
compare unfavorably with those obtained by Maniagi et al. (2013) who 
found a mean ROA of 9.836 % and a maximum and minimum ROA of 
92.990% and -8.000% respectively for a sample of non-financial listed firms 
in Kenya. This means that firms listed at the NSE earn a Kshs 16.5 profit on 
every Kshs 100 they own in their respective companies. This can be 
attributable to high profit margins, a rapid turnover of assets, or a 
combination of both.  
 Tobin’s Q, a measure that combines market performance with book 
values, shows a high mean value of 1.319. This may indicate that most of the 
firms are overvalued relative to their book values. In line with previous 
studies (Morck et al., 1988), Tobin’s Q is operationalized as the ratio of 
market capitalization to book value of assets. Copeland et al. (2005) provides 
a framework for interpreting Q ratio. A low Q (between 0 and 1) means that 
the cost to replace a firm’s assets is greater than the value of the stock 
implying that the stock is undervalued. Conversely, a high Q (greater than 1) 
implies that the firm’s stock is more expensive than the replacement cost of 
its assets indicating that the stock is overvalued (Copeland et al., 2005). The 
average Tobin’s Q ratio of 1.319 which is greater than 1(q >1) implying that 
listed firms’ stock is more expensive than the replacement cost of its assets. 
Moreover, the firms’ market capitalizations supersede their book value of 
assets by close to 32 per cent.  The highest and lowest Tobin’s Qs are 7.791 
and 0.061 respectively. This shows that firms listed at the NSE had wide 
variation in market values relative to book values.  The mean Tobin’s Q 
compares favorably with that obtained by Andres (2008) of 1.599. 
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Consequently, this means that equities (stocks) of firms listed at the NSE are 
overvalued since average Tobin’s Q is greater than 1. 
 The financial leverage ratio show that the average firm listed on the 
NSE employs only 0.258 Kenyan Shilling of long-term debt for every 
Shilling of total capital employed. Clearly, Kenyan firms either prefer to 
finance their long-term activities through equity or find themselves in that 
situation courtesy of uncontrollable reasons such as unavailability of 
diversified long-term financing sources in the capital market (see Gwatidzo 
and Ojah, 2014). In tandem with previous studies (Maniagi et al., 2013, 
Wanjeri, 2012 and Vitor and Badu, 2012) financial leverage is measured in 
term of the ratio of total long-term debt to total capital in the firm. This value 
is comparable to the mean financial leverage of 22.64 % obtained by 
Maniagi et al. (2013) and is 1.63 times lower than mean financial leverage 
obtained by Wanjeri (2012). However, it is 9.7 times higher than mean 
financial leverage obtained by Vitor and Badu (2012) in Turkey. This 
implies that out of the total capital base (100 %); about 26 % is financed 
using borrowed money (debt) while 74 % is financed using equity and other 
sources. This indicates that on average Kenya’s listed firms do not heavily 
rely on debts to finance their activities implying that these firms could be 
financing their activities through retained earnings and other sources. The 
range between the highest and lowest financial leverage implies that some 
firms were highly financially leveraged while others were all-equity 
financed. 
  About 55.6 % of all assets are tangible. This result is consistent with 
previous studies that identified asset tangibility as a firm-specific driver of 
performance (Kakani and Kaul, 2001, Agustinus and Rachmadi, 2008 and 
Murillo, 2007). 
 Ownership concentration ratio indicates that 64.286 % of total 
shareholding belongs to the top five shareholders. This value is 1.344 times 
higher than mean ownership concentration obtained by Isik and Soykan 
(2013) of 48.57 %. This means that of the total shareholding of firms listed at 
the NSE, top five shareholders stake is 64.286 % and only 35.714 % of the 
total shareholding belongs to dispersed ownership implying that shares of 
firms listed at the NSE are closely held. 
 
Unit root tests 
 Before empirical estimations are conducted, the data series are 
subjected to unit root tests to establish their stationarity conditions, that is, 
their orders of integration. Where a series is found to be non-stationary at 
levels, it is differenced until it became stationary (Gujarati, 2007, Baltagi, 
2001). To test for unit roots two common methodologies, that is, the Levin, 
Lin, Chu (LLC) and Im, Pesaran, Shin (IPS) were employed. Table 2:  
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provides a summary of the panel unit root test results. The results indicate 
that all variables are integrated of order zero, that is, are stationary at levels. 
Given that all variables were integrated of order zero, there was therefore no 
need to test for cointegration in the series. 
Table 2: Summary of Panel Unit Root Test Results on Study Variables 
Variable Levin, Lin, Chu (LLC) 
Im, Pesaran, 
Shin (IPS) Conclusion 
Financial Leverage (LEV) -36.009 (0.000)*** 
-10.068 
(0.000)*** I(0) 
Ownership Concentration (OWNC) -24.566 (0.000)*** 
-4.861 
(0.000)*** 
 
I(0) 
Tobin’s Q -153.376 (0.000)*** 
-27.165 
(0.000)*** I(0) 
Return on Equity (ROE) -9.391 (0.000)*** 
-2.221 
(0.000) *** I(0) 
Return on Assets (ROA) -42.944 (0.000)*** 
-9.729 
(0.000) *** I(0) 
Tangibility (TANG -28.793 (0.000)*** 
-5.426 
(0.000) *** I(0) 
Note:  P values in parentheses, *** represent significance at 1 %. 
Source: Field Data, 2014 
 
Empirical results and discussions 
Bivariate Association between Financial Leverage and  
Performance of Listed Firms 
 In order to assess the effect of financial leverage on performance, 
Pearson’s correlation analysis is performed.  It is a measure of strength of 
association between two variables. Correlation coefficients are used to 
determine the magnitude and direction of associations. Their values range 
from -1 (perfect negative correlation) to +1 (perfect positive correlation). 
The nearer the values are to these two values, the stronger the relationship. 
The more the coefficients are close to 0, the less the relationship; at 0, there 
is no relationship (Danthine et al., 2005 and Maddala, 2008). The result 
presents how financial leverage associate with the dependent variables 
constructs namely ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
         Table 3: Correlations of Financial Leverage with Performance Constructs for Listed Firms 
Correlation    
Probability LEV ROA ROE TOBIN’S Q 
1. LEV 1.0000    
 -----    
2. ROA -0.3047*** 1.0000   
 (0.0000) -----   
3. ROE -0.1583*** 0.2480 1.0000  
 (0.0099) (0.0741) -----  
4. TOBIN’S Q -0.3494*** 0.1287 0.0927 1.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0542) (0.3574) ----- 
 Source: Field Data, 2014 
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 From Table 3, the association between financial leverage and return 
on equity, r = -.158 (p = .009) is weak though significant at 99 % confidence 
level. The association between financial leverage and return on assets, r = -
.305 (p = .000) and is equally weak though highly significant and lastly, the 
association between financial leverage and Tobin’s Q, r = -.349 (p = .000) 
and is also weak though significant. Given that ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q 
are constructs of financial performance, the directions of association are 
consistent with literature (Maniagi et al., 2013, Odongo et al., 2014, 
Gicheha, 2012, San and Heng, 2011, Bokpin et al., 2010, Onaolapo and 
Kajola, 2010, Omran and Pointon, 2009, Shah and Khan, 2007). These 
studies propose that negative association between financial leverage and 
performance is feasible and therefore acceptable. However, the results are at 
variance with the findings of Deesomsak et al. (2004) who find a negative 
but insignificant association between financial leverage and performance 
among Malaysian firms. 
 The correlation coefficients of these associations however, are small 
(r < -.50) indicating that some other variables might be influencing the 
associations between the variables (Maddala, 2005). As a result, further 
analysis permitting all variables that influence financial performance at once 
is necessary. 
Bivariate results between financial leverage and financial performance 
constructs show that financial leverage has significant negative association 
with ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. The magnitudes of associations are however 
small than expected. 
 
Multivariate Relationships between Financial Leverage and 
Performance of Listed Firms 
 Panel regression analysis, a multivariate analysis technique is used to 
estimate equations 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 respectively. Table 4.4 presents the panel 
multiple regression results on the effect of financial leverage on performance 
of listed firms. 
 The results indicate that financial leverage is a significant negative 
predictor of performance measured in terms of return on assets (ROA), β = - 
.0438 ( p = .0350) and Tobin’s Q, β = -.5144 ( p = .0124).  These values are 
statistically significant since the p-values are less than 0.05. It can be inferred 
from these values that a unit change in financial leverage leads to a decrease 
in return on assets and Tobin’s Q of firms listed at the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange of 0.0438 and 0.5144, respectively, all things being fixed. 
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis that financial leverage has effect on 
performance of firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange is accepted. 
Moreover, financial leverage predicts performance measured in terms of 
return on equity, β = -.0176 (p = .5765) negatively but insignificantly.  These 
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results concur with the previous studies (Gleason et al., 2000, Upneja and 
Dalbor, 2001, Deesomsak et al., 2004 and San and Heng, 2011) who report 
negative association between financial leverage and financial performance. 
However, Asian studies (Deesomsak et al., 2004 and San and Heng, 2011) 
document negative and insignificant relationship between financial leverage 
and performance. Also, these findings are at variance with those of Maniagi 
et al., 2013, Gicheha, 2012, and Wanjeri, 2012 who report both positive and 
negative relationship between financial leverage and performance for non-
financial listed firms. Due to agency conflicts between various stakeholders, 
listed firms seem to have employed financial leverage levels which have 
negatively affected the performance of these firms. 
 The results indicate that ownership concentration is a significant 
negative predictor of performance measured in terms of Tobin’s Q, β = -
.0057 (p = .0353).  This value is statistically significant since the p-values 
are less than 0.05. It can be inferred from this value that a unit change in 
ownership concentration leads to a decrease in Tobin’s Q of firms listed at 
the Nairobi Securities Exchange of 0.0057, all things being fixed. Moreover, 
ownership concentration predicts performance measured in terms of return 
on equity, β = -.0005 (p = .4206) and ROA, β = -.0002 (p = .5965) negatively 
but insignificantly.  These results concur with the previous studies (Ongore, 
2011, Wiwattanakantang, 2001 and Gonenc, 2006) who report a negative 
relationship between ownership concentration and performance. The findings 
are however at variance with other previous studies (Uadiale, 2010, Mandaci 
and Gumus, 2010 and Chen et al., 2005) who found that ownership 
concentration had a positive and significant relationship with company 
performance. 
 In addition, the regression results show that asset tangibility is a 
positive significant predictor of ROE (β = .0200 (p = .0630) and Tobin’s Q 
(β = .2302 (p = .0215) showing that 1 % increase in asset tangibility is 
associated with an increase of .0200 %, and .2302% all things being equal. 
This finding concurs with that of Shen and Rin (2012) and Murillo (2007) 
who found a positive and significant relationship between asset tangibility 
and firm’s performance. In addition, asset tangibility is a negative 
insignificant predictor of ROA (β = -.0025 (p = .6030).  
 Thus use of panel methodology and multiple measures of 
performance reconciles conflicting results and therefore financial leverage 
has a significant negative effect on firm’s performance as measured in terms 
of ROA and Tobin’s Q and negative insignificant effect on ROE.  This 
implies that as firms use more financial leverage, financial performance in 
terms of ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q declines. 
 The Robustness checks for the three models, that is, equations 3.2, 
3.3 and 3.4 are done using adjusted R squared. The adjusted R squared is the 
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adjusted coefficient of determination which shows proportion of variation in 
the dependent variable explained by the regression model (Gujarati, 2003).  
The adjusted R2 for three models, that is, ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q is 
0.7732, 0.8852 and 0.8594 respectively which reflect a good fit. 
 As a result, the hypothesized multiple linear regression models are 
therefore fitted as shown in equations 1, 2 and 3 with t-statistic values in the 
parentheses. 
ROE
^
=
1192.1
0657.1
=t
-
5595.0
0176.0
−=t
LEV -
8071.0
0005.0
−=t
OWNC +
8695.1
0200.0
=t
TANG   (5) 
ROA
^
=
5639.1
0602.0
=t
-
1226.2
0438.0
−=t
LEV -
5303.0
0002.0
−=t
OWNC -
5209.0
0025.0
−=t
TANG   (6) 
SQTOBIN '
^
=
9377.9
1563.5
=t
-
5242.2
5144.0
−=t
LEV -
1191.2
0057.0
−=t
OWNC +
3179.2
0023.0
=t
TANG   (7) 
Table 4: Panel Least Squares Multiple Regression Estimation Results on the Effect of 
Financial Leverage, Ownership Concentration, Selected Control Variables and Performance 
of Listed Firms 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Three conclusions can be drawn based on the preceding evidence. 
The first conclusion is that financial leverage is an important negative 
predictor of financial performance measured in terms of ROA and Tobin’s 
Q. This negative prediction based on trade off theory; imply exhaustion of 
debt tax shield and potential financial distress.  
Secondly, it is concluded that ownership concentration is a pertinent negative 
predictor of financial performance measured in terms of Tobin’s Q.  
The third conclusion is that asset tangibility is a significant positive predictor 
of performance measured in terms of ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
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